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Abstract
Social media systems rely on user feedback and rating
mechanisms for personalization, ranking, and content
filtering. However, when users evaluate content con-
tributed by fellow users (e.g., by liking a post or voting
on a comment), these evaluations create complex social
feedback effects. This paper investigates how ratings on
a piece of content affect its author’s future behavior.
By studying four large comment-based news communi-
ties, we find that negative feedback leads to significant
behavioral changes that are detrimental to the commu-
nity. Not only do authors of negatively-evaluated con-
tent contribute more, but also their future posts are of
lower quality, and are perceived by the community as
such. Moreover, these authors are more likely to sub-
sequently evaluate their fellow users negatively, perco-
lating these effects through the community. In contrast,
positive feedback does not carry similar effects, and nei-
ther encourages rewarded authors to write more, nor im-
proves the quality of their posts. Interestingly, the au-
thors that receive no feedback are most likely to leave
a community. Furthermore, a structural analysis of the
voter network reveals that evaluations polarize the com-
munity the most when positive and negative votes are
equally split.
Introduction
The ability of users to rate content and provide feedback
is a defining characteristic of today’s social media systems.
These ratings enable the discovery of high-quality and trend-
ing content, as well as personalized content ranking, filter-
ing, and recommendation. However, when these ratings ap-
ply to content generated by fellow users—helpfulness rat-
ings of product reviews, likes on Facebook posts, or up-
votes on news comments or forum posts—evaluations also
become a mean of social interaction. This can create social
feedback loops that affect the behavior of the author whose
content was evaluated, as well as the entire community.
Online rating and evaluation systems have been ex-
tensively researched in the past. The focus has primar-
ily been on predicting user-generated ratings (Kim et al.
2006; Ghose and Ipeirotis 2007; Otterbacher 2009; An-
derson et al. 2012b) and on understanding their effects at
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the community-level (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2009;
Anderson et al. 2012a; Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor 2013;
Sipos, Ghosh, and Joachims 2014). However, little attention
has been dedicated to studying the effects that ratings have
on the behavior of the author whose content is being evalu-
ated.
Ideally, feedback would lead users to behave in ways that
benefit the community. Indeed, if positive ratings act as “re-
ward” stimuli and negative ratings act as “punishment” stim-
uli, the operant conditioning framework from behavioral
psychology (Skinner 1938) predicts that community feed-
back should guide authors to generate better content in the
future, and that punished authors will contribute less than
rewarded authors. However, despite being one of the funda-
mental frameworks in behavioral psychology, there is lim-
ited empirical evidence of operant conditioning effects on
humans1 (Baron, Perone, and Galizio 1991). Moreover, it
remains unclear whether community feedback in complex
online social systems brings the intuitive beneficial effects
predicted by this theory.
In this work we develop a methodology for quantifying
and comparing the effects of rewards and punishments on
multiple facets of the author’s future behavior in the com-
munity, and relate these effects to the broader theoretical
framework of operant conditioning. In particular, we seek to
understand whether community feedback regulates the qual-
ity and quantity of a user’s future contributions in a way that
benefits the community.
By applying our methodology to four large online news
communities for which we have complete article comment-
ing and comment voting data (about 140 million votes on 42
million comments), we discover that community feedback
does not appear to drive the behavior of users in a direc-
tion that is beneficial to the community, as predicted by the
operant conditioning framework. Instead, we find that com-
munity feedback is likely to perpetuate undesired behavior.
In particular, punished authors actually write worse2 in sub-
1The framework was developed and tested mainly through ex-
periments on animal behavior (e.g., rats and pigeons); the lack of
human experimentation can be attributed to methodological and
ethical issues, especially with regards to punishment stimuli (e.g.
electric shocks).
2One important subtlety here is that the observed quality of a
post (i.e., the proportion of up-votes) is not entirely a direct conse-
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sequent posts, while rewarded authors do not improve sig-
nificantly.
In spite of this detrimental effect on content quality, it
is conceivable that community feedback still helps regu-
late quantity by selectively discouraging contributions from
punished authors and encouraging rewarded authors to con-
tribute more. Surprisingly, we find that negative feedback ac-
tually leads to more (and more frequent) future contributions
than positive feedback does.3 Taken together, our findings
suggest that the content evaluation mechanisms currently
implemented in social media systems have effects contrary
to the interest of the community.
To further understand differences in social mechanisms
causing these behavior changes, we conducted a structural
analysis of the voter network around popular posts. We dis-
cover that not only does positive and negative feedback tend
to come from communities of users, but that the voting net-
work is most polarized when votes are split equally between
up- and down-votes.
These observations underscore the asymmetry between
the effects of positive and negative feedback: the detrimen-
tal impact of punishments is much more noticeable than the
beneficial impact of rewards. This asymmetry echoes the
negativity effect studied extensively in social psychology lit-
erature: negative events have a greater impact on individu-
als than positive events of the same intensity (Kanouse and
Hanson 1972; Baumeister et al. 2001).
To summarize our contributions, in this paper we
• validate through a crowdsourcing experiment that the pro-
portion of up-votes is a robust metric for measuring and
aggregating community feedback,
• introduce a framework based on propensity score match-
ing for quantifying the effects of community feedback on
a user’s post quality,
• discover that effects of community evaluations are gener-
ally detrimental to the community, contradicting the intu-
ition brought up by the operant conditioning theory, and
• reveal an important asymmetry between the mechanisms
underlying negative and positive feedback.
Our results lead to a better understanding of how users re-
act to peer evaluations, and point to ways in which online
rating mechanisms can be improved to better serve individ-
uals, as well as entire communities.
Further Related Work
Our contributions come in the context of an extensive lit-
erature examining social media voting systems. One major
research direction is concerned with predicting the helpful-
ness ratings of product reviews starting from textual and
social factors (Ghose and Ipeirotis 2007; Liu et al. 2007;
Otterbacher 2009; Tsur and Rappoport 2009; Lu et al. 2010;
quence of the actual textual quality of the post, but is also affected
by community bias effects. We account for this through experi-
ments specifically designed to disentangle these two factors.
3We note that these observations cannot simply be attributed to
flame wars, as they spread over a much larger time scale.
Mudambi and Schuff 2010) and understanding the underlay-
ing social dynamics (Chen, Dhanasobhon, and Smith 2008;
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2009; Wu and Huberman
2010; Sipos, Ghosh, and Joachims 2014). The mechanisms
driving user voting behavior and the related community ef-
fects have been studied in other contexts, such as Q&A sites
(Anderson et al. 2012a), Wikipedia (Burke and Kraut 2008;
Leskovec, Huttenlocher, and Kleinberg 2010; Anderson et
al. 2012b), YouTube (Siersdorfer et al. 2010), social news
aggregation sites (Lampe and Resnick 2004; Lampe and
Johnston 2005; Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor 2013) and on-
line multiplayer games (Shores et al. 2014). Our work adds
an important dimension to this general line of research, by
providing a framework for analyzing the effects votes have
on the author of the evaluated content.
The setting considered in this paper, that of comments on
news sites and blogs, has also been used to study other social
phenomena such as controversy (Chen and Berger 2013),
political polarization (Park et al. 2011; Balasubramanyan et
al. 2012), and community formation (Go´mez, Kaltenbrun-
ner, and Lo´pez 2008; Gonzalez-Bailon, Kaltenbrunner, and
Banchs 2010). News commenting systems have also been
analyzed from a community design perspective (Mishne and
Glance 2006; Gilbert, Bergstrom, and Karahalios 2009; Di-
akopoulos and Naaman 2011), including a particular focus
on understanding what types of articles are likely to attract a
large volume of user comments (Tsagkias, Weerkamp, and
de Rijke 2009; Yano and Smith 2010). In contrast, our anal-
ysis focuses on the effects of voting on the behavior of the
author whose content is being evaluated.
Our findings here reveal that negative feedback does not
lead to a decrease of undesired user behavior, but rather
attenuates it. Given the difficulty of moderating undesired
user behavior, it is worth pointing out that anti-social be-
havior in social media systems is a growing concern (Hey-
mann, Koutrika, and Garcia-Molina 2007), as emphasized
by work on review spamming (Lim et al. 2010; Mukher-
jee, Liu, and Glance 2012; Ott, Cardie, and Hancock 2012),
trolling (Shachaf and Hara 2010), social deviance (Shores et
al. 2014) and online harassment (Yin et al. 2009).
Measuring Community Feedback
We aim to develop a methodology for studying the subtle
effects of community-provided feedback on the behavior of
content authors in realistic large-scale settings. To this end,
we start by describing a longitudinal dataset where millions
of users explicitly evaluate each others’ content. Following
that, we discuss a crowdsourcing experiment that helps es-
tablish a robust aggregate measure of community feedback.
Dataset description
We investigate four online news communities: CNN.com
(general news), Breitbart.com (political news), IGN.com
(computer gaming), and Allkpop.com (Korean entertain-
ment), selected based on diversity and their large size. Com-
mon to all these sites is that community members post com-
ments on (news) articles, where each comment can then be
up- or down-voted by other users. We refer to a comment as
a post and to all posts relating to the same article as a thread.
Community # Threads # Posts # Votes (Prop. Up-votes) # Registered Users
Prop. Up-votes
Q1 Q3
CNN 200,576 26,552,104 58,088,478 (0.82) 1,111,755 0.73 1.00
IGN 682,870 7,967,414 40,302,961 (0.84) 289,576 0.69 1.00
Breitbart 376,526 4,376,369 18,559,688 (0.94) 214,129 0.96 1.00
allkpop 35,620 3,901,487 20,306,076 (0.95) 198,922 0.84 1.00
Table 1: Summary statistics of the four communities analyzed in this study. The lower (Q1) and upper (Q3) quartiles for the
proportion of up-votes only takes into account posts with at least ten votes.
From the commenting service provider, we obtained com-
plete timestamped trace of user activity from March 2012 to
August 2013.4 We restrict our analysis to users who joined
a given community after March 2012, so that we are able to
track users’ behavior from their “birth” onwards. As shown
in Table 1 the data includes 1.2 million threads with 42 mil-
lion comments, and 140 million votes from 1.8 million dif-
ferent users. In all communities around 50% of posts receive
at least one vote, and 10% receive at least 10 votes.
Measures of Community Feedback
Given a post with with some number of up- and down-votes
we next require a measure that aggregates the post’s votes
into a single number, and that corresponds to the magnitude
of reward/punishment received by the author of the post.
However, it is not a priori clear how to design such a mea-
sure. For example, consider a post that received P up-votes
and N down-votes. How can we combine P and N into a
single number that best reflects the overall evaluation of the
community? There are several natural candidates for such
a measure: the total number of up-votes (P ) received by a
post, the proportion of up-votes (P/(P +N)), or the differ-
ence in number of up-/down-votes (P −N ). However, each
of these measures has a particular drawback:P does not con-
sider the number of down-votes (e.g., 10+/0- vs. 10+/20-);
P/(P + N) does not differentiate between absolute num-
bers of votes received (e.g., 4+/1- vs. 40+/10-); and, P −N
does not consider the effect relative to the total number of
posts (e.g., 5+/0- vs. 50+/45-).
To understand what a person’s “utility function” for votes
is, we conducted an Amazon Mechanical Turk experiment
that asked users how they would perceive receiving a given
number of up- and down-votes. On a seven-point Likert
scale, workers rated how they would feel about receiving a
certain number of up- and down-votes on a comment that
they made. The number of up- and down-votes was var-
ied between 0 and 20, and each worker responded to 10
randomly-selected pairs of up-votes and down-votes. We
then took the average response as the mean rating for each
pair. 66 workers labeled 4,302 pairs in total, with each pair
obtaining at least 9 independent evaluations.
We find that the proportion of up-votes (P/(P + N)) is
a very good measure of how positively a user perceives a
certain number of up-votes and down-votes. In Figure 1, we
notice a strong “diagonal” effect, suggesting that increasing
4This is prior to an interface change that hides down-votes.
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Figure 1: People perceive votes received as proportions,
rather than as absolute numbers. Higher ratings correspond
to more positive perceptions.
the total number of votes received, while maintaining the
proportion of up-votes constant, does not significantly alter
a user’s perception. In Table 2 we evaluate how different
measures correlate with human ratings, and find that P/(P+
N) explains almost all the variance and achieves the highest
R2 of 0.92. While other more complex measures could result
in slightly higher R2, we subsequently use p = P/(P +N)
because it is both intuitive and fairly robust.
Thus, for the rest of the paper we use the proportion of
up-votes (denoted as p) as the measure of the overall feed-
back of the community. We consider a post to be positively
evaluated if the proportion of up-votes received is in the up-
per quartile Q3 (75th percentile) of all posts, and negatively
evaluated if the fraction is instead in the lower quartile Q1
(25th percentile). This lets us account for differences in com-
munity voting norms: in some communities, a post may be
perceived as bad, even with a high fraction of up-votes (e.g.
Breitbart). As the proportion of up-votes is skewed in most
Measure R2 F-Statistic p-value
P 0.410 F (439) = 306.1 < 10−16
P −N 0.879 F (438) = 1603 < 10−16
P/(P +N) 0.920 F (438) = 5012 < 10−16
Table 2: The proportion of up-votes p = P/(P + N)
best captures a person’s perception of up-voting and down-
voting, according to a crowdsourcing experiment.
communities, at the 75th percentile all votes already tend to
be up-votes (i.e, feedback is 100% positive). Further, in or-
der to obtain sufficient precision of community feedback, we
require that these posts have at least ten votes.
Unless specified otherwise, all reported observations are
consistent across all four communities we studied. For
brevity, the figures that follow are reported only for CNN,
with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals.
Post Quality
The operant conditioning framework posits that an individ-
ual’s behavior is guided by the consequences of its past
behavior (Skinner 1938). In our setting, this would predict
that community feedback would lead users to produce bet-
ter content. Specifically, we expect that users punished via
negative feedback would either improve the quality of their
posts, or contribute less. Similarly, users rewarded by receiv-
ing positive feedback would write higher quality posts, and
contribute more often.
In this section, we focus on understanding the effects of
positive and negative feedback on the the quality of one’s
posts. We start by simply measuring the post quality as the
proportion of up-votes a given post received, denoted by p.
Figure 2 plots the proportion of up-votes p as a function
of time for users who received a positive, negative or neu-
tral evaluation. We compare the proportion of up-votes of
posts written before receiving the positive/negative evalua-
tion with that of posts written after the evaluation. Interest-
ingly, there is no significant difference for positively evalu-
ated users (i.e., there is no significant difference between p
before and after the evaluation event).
In the case of a negative evaluation however, punishment
leads to worse community feedback in the future. More pre-
cisely, the difference in the proportion of up-votes received
by a user before/after the feedback event is statistically sig-
nificant at p < 0.05. This means that negative feedback
seems to have exactly the opposite effect than predicted by
the operant conditioning framework (Skinner 1938). Rather
than feedback leading to better posts, Figure 2 suggests that
punished users actually get worse, not better, after receiving
a negative evaluation.
Textual vs. Community Effects
One important subtlety is that the observed proportion of
up-votes is not entirely a direct consequence of the actual
textual quality of the post, but could also be due to a com-
munity’s biased perception of a user. In particular, the drop
in the proportion of up-votes received by users after nega-
tive evaluations observed in Figure 2 could be explained by
two non-mutually exclusive phenomena: (1) after negative
evaluations, the user writes posts that are of lower quality
than before (textual quality), or (2) users that are known to
produce low quality posts automatically receive lower eval-
uations in the future, regardless of the actual textual quality
of the post (community bias).
We disentangle these two effects through a methodology
inspired by propensity matching, a statistical technique used
to support causality claims in observational studies (Rosen-
baum and Rubin 1983).
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Figure 2: Proportion of up-votes before/after a user receives
a positive (“Pos”), negative (“Neg”) or neutral (“Avg”) eval-
uation. After a positive evaluation, future evaluations of an
author’s posts do not differ significantly from before. How-
ever, after a negative evaluation, an author receives worse
evaluations than before.
First, we build a machine learning model that predicts a
post’s quality (q) by training a binomial regression model
using only textual features extracted from the post’s content,
i.e. q is the predicted proportion of a post’s up-votes. This
way we are able to model the relationship between the con-
tent of a post and the post’s quality. This model was trained
on half the posts in the community, and used to predict q for
the other half (mean R = 0.22).
We validate this model using human-labeled text qual-
ity scores obtained for a sample of posts (n = 171). Us-
ing Crowdflower, a crowdsourcing platform, workers were
asked to label posts as either “good” (defined as something
that a user would want to read, or that contributes to the
discussion), or “bad” (the opposite). They were only shown
the text of individual posts, and no information about the
post’s author. Ten workers independently labeled each post,
and these labels were aggregated into a “quality score” q′,
the proportion of “good” labels. We find that the correlation
of q′ with q (R2 = 0.25) is more than double of that with
p (R2 = 0.12), suggesting that q is a reasonable approxi-
mation of text quality. The low correlation of q′ with p also
suggests that a community effect influences the value of p.
Since the model was trained to predict the proportion of
a post’s fraction of up-votes p, but only encodes text fea-
tures (bigrams), the predicted proportion of up-votes q corre-
sponds to the quality of the post’s text. In other words, when
we compare changes in q, these can be attributed to changes
in the text, rather than to how a community perceives the
user.5 Thus, this model allows us to assess the textual qual-
ity of the post q, while the difference between the predicted
and true proportion of up-votes (p− q) allows us to quantify
community bias.
5Even though the predicted proportion of up-votes q can be
biased by user and community effects, this bias affects all posts
equally (since the model is only trained on textual features). In fact,
we find the model error, p − q, to be uniformly distributed across
all values of p.
Figure 3: To measure the effects of positive and negative
evaluations on post quality, we match pairs of posts of simi-
lar textual quality q(a0) ≈ q(b0) written by two users A and
B with similar post histories, where A’s post a0 received a
positive evaluation, andB’s post b0 received a negative eval-
uation. We then compute the change in quality in the subse-
quent three posts: q(a[1,3])− q(a0) and q(b[1,3])− q(b0).
Using the textual regression model, we match pairs of
users (A,B) that contributed posts of similar quality, but
that received very different evaluations: A’s post was pos-
itively evaluated, while B’s post was negatively evaluated.
This experimental design can be interpreted as selecting
pairs of users that appear indistinguishable before the “treat-
ment” (i.e., evaluation) event, but where one was punished
while the other rewarded. The goal then is to measure the ef-
fect of the treatment on the users’ future behavior. As the two
users “looked the same” before the treatment, any change in
their future behavior can be attributed to the effect of the
treatment (i.e., the act of receiving a positive or a negative
evaluation).
Figure 3 summarizes our experimental setting. Here, A’s
post a0 received a positive evaluation and B’s post b0 re-
ceived a negative evaluation, and we ensure that these posts
are of the same textual quality, |q(a0) − q(b0)| ≤ 10−4.
We further control for the number of words written by the
user, as well as for the user’s past behavior: both the number
of posts written before the evaluation was received, and the
mean proportion of up-votes votes received on posts in the
past (Table 3). To establish the effect of reward and punish-
ment we then examine the next three posts of A (a[1,3]) and
the next three posts of B (b[1,3]).
It is safe to assume that when a user contributes the first
post a1 after being punished or rewarded, the feedback on
her previous post a0 has already been received. Depending
on the community, in roughly 70 to 80% of the cases the
feedback on post a0 at time of a1’s posting is within 1% of
a0’s final feedback p(a0).
How feedback affects a user’s post quality. To under-
stand whether evaluations result in a change of text quality,
we compare the post quality for users A and B before and
after they receive a punishment or a reward. Importantly, we
do not compare the actual fraction p of up-votes received by
the posts, but rather the fraction q as predicted by the text-
only regression model.
By design, both A and B write posts of similar quality
q(a0) ≈ q(b0) at time t = 0. We then compute the quality
of the three posts following t = 0 as the average predicted
fraction of up-votes q(a[1,3]) of posts a1, a2, a3. Finally, we
compare the post quality before/after the treatment event, by
computing the difference ∆a = q(a[1,3]) − q(a0) for the
rewarded user A. Similarly, we compute ∆b = q(b[1,3]) −
q(b0) for the punished user B.
Now, if the positive (respectively negative) feedback has
no effect and the post quality does not change, then the dif-
ference ∆a (respectively ∆b) should be close to zero. How-
ever, if subsequent post quality changes, then this quantity
should be different from zero. Moreover, the sign of ∆a (re-
spectively ∆b) gives us the direction of change: a positive
value means that the post quality of positively (respectively
negatively) evaluated users improves, while a negative value
means that post quality drops after the evaluation.
Using a Mann-Whitney’s U test, we find that across all
communities, the quality of text significantly changes af-
ter the evaluation. In particular, we find that the post qual-
ity significantly drops after a negative evaluation (∆b < 0
at significance level p < 0.05 and effect size r > 0.06).
This effect is similar both within and across threads (aver-
age r = 0.19, 0.18 respectively). While the effect of nega-
tive feedback is consistent across all communities, the effect
of positive feedback is inconsistent and not significant.
These results are interesting as they establish the effect
of reward and punishment on the quality of a user’s fu-
ture posts. Surprisingly, our findings are in a sense exactly
the opposite than what we would expect under the operant
conditioning framework. Rather than evaluations increasing
the user’s post quality and steering the community towards
higher quality discussions, we find that negative evaluations
actually decrease post quality, with no clear trend for posi-
tive evaluations having an effect either way.
How feedback affects community perception. We also
aim to quantify whether evaluations changes the commu-
nity’s perception of the evaluated user (community bias).
That is, do users that generally contribute good posts “un-
deservedly” receive more up-votes for posts that may actu-
ally not be that good? And similarly, do users that tend to
contribute bad posts receive more down-votes even for posts
that are in fact good?
To measure the community perception effect we use the
experimental setup already illustrated in Figure 3. As be-
fore, we first match users (A,B) on the predicted frac-
tion of up-votes q; we then measure the residual differ-
ence between the true and the predicted fraction of up-votes
p(a[1:3])−q(a[1:3]) after userA’s treatment (analogously for
user B). Systematic non-zero residual differences are sug-
gestive of community bias effects, i.e., posts get evaluated
differently from how they should be based solely on their
textual quality. Specifically, if the community evaluates a
user’s posts higher than expected then the residual differ-
ence is positive, and if a user’s posts are evaluated lower
than expected then the residual difference is negative.
Across all communities, posts written by a user after re-
ceiving negative evaluations are perceived worse than the
Before matching After matching
Positive (A) Negative (B) Positive (A) Negative (B)
n = 72463 n = 39788 n = 35640 n = 35640
Textual quality q(a0) / q(b0) 0.885 0.810 0.828 0.828
Number of words 42.1 34.5 29.8 30.0
Number of past posts 507 735 596 607
Prop. positive votes on past posts 0.833 0.650 0.669 0.668
Table 3: To obtain pairs of positively and negatively evaluated users that were as similar as possible, we matched these user
pairs on post quality and the user’s past behavior. On the CNN dataset, the mean values of these statistics were significantly
closer after matching. Similar results were also obtained for other communities.
Figure 4: The effect of evaluations on user behavior. We ob-
serve that both community perception and text quality is sig-
nificantly worse after a negative evaluation than after a pos-
itive evaluation (in spite of the initial post and user match-
ing). Significant differences are indicated with stars, and the
scale of effects have been edited for visibility.
text-only model prediction, and this discrepancy is much
larger than the one observed after positive evaluations (p <
10−16, r > 0.03). This effect is also stronger within threads
(average r = 0.57) than across threads (average r = 0.13).
For instance, after a negative evaluation on CNN, posts writ-
ten by the punished author in the same thread are evaluated
on average 48 percentage points lower than expected by just
considering their text.
Note that the true magnitude of these effects could be
smaller than reported, as using a different set of textual fea-
tures could result in a more accurate classifier, and hence
smaller residuals. Nevertheless, the experiment on post qual-
ity presented earlier does not suffer from these potential
classifier deficiencies.
Summary. Figure 4 summarizes our observations regard-
ing the effects of community feedback on the textual and
perceived quality of the author’s future posts. We plot the
textual quality and proportion of up-votes before and after
the evaluation event (“treatment”). Before the evaluation the
textual quality of the posts of two users A and B is indistin-
guishable, i.e., q(a0) ≈ q(b0). However, after the evaluation
event, the textual quality of the posts of the positively evalu-
ated userA remains at the same level, i.e., q(a0) ≈ q(a[1:3]),
while the quality of the posts of the negatively evaluated user
B drops significantly, i.e., q(b0) > q(b[1:3]). We conclude
that community feedback does not improve the quality of
discussions, as predicted by the operand conditioning theory.
Instead, punished authors actually write worse in subsequent
posts, while rewarded authors do not improve significantly.
We also find suggestive evidence of community bias ef-
fects, creating a discrepancy between the perceived quality
of a user’s posts and their textual quality. This perception
bias appears to mostly affect negatively evaluated users: the
perceived quality of their subsequent posts p(b[1:3]) is much
lower than their textual quality q(b[1:3]), as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that community percep-
tion is an important factor in determining the proportion of
up-votes a post receives.
Overall, we notice an important asymmetry between the
effects of positive and negative feedback: the detrimental ef-
fects of punishments are much more noticeable than the ben-
eficial effects of rewards. This asymmetry echoes the nega-
tivity effect studied extensively in the social psychology lit-
erature (Kanouse and Hanson 1972; Baumeister et al. 2001).
User Activity
Despite the detrimental effect of community feedback on
an author’s content quality, community feedback could still
have a beneficial effect by selectively regulating quantity,
i.e., discouraging contributions from punished authors and
encouraging rewarded authors to contribute more.
To establish whether this is indeed the case we again use
a methodology based on propensity score matching, where
our variable of interest is now posting frequency. As before,
we pair users that wrote posts of the same textual quality (ac-
cording to the textual regression model), ensuring that one
post was positively evaluated, and the other negatively eval-
uated. We further control for the variable of interest by con-
sidering matching pairs of users that had the same posting
frequency before the evaluation. This methodology allows
us to compare the effect of positive and negative feedback
on the author’s future posting frequency.
Figure 5 plots the ratio between inverse posting frequency
after the treatment and inverse posting frequency before the
treatment, where inverse frequency is measured as the av-
erage time between posts in a window of three posts af-
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Figure 5: Negative evaluations increase posting frequency
more than positive evaluations; in contrast, users that re-
ceived no feedback slow down. (Values below 100 corre-
spond to an increase in posting frequency after the evalua-
tion; a lower value corresponds to a larger increase.)
ter/before the treatment. Contrary to what operant condition-
ing would predict, we find that negative evaluations encour-
age users to post more frequently. Comparing the change
in frequency of the punished users with that of the rewarded
users, we also see that negative evaluations have a greater ef-
fect than positive evaluations (p < 10−15, r > 0.18). More-
over, when we examine the users who received no feedback
on their posts, we find that they actually slow down. In par-
ticular, users who received no feedback write about 15% less
frequently, while those who received positive feedback write
20% more frequently than before, and those who received
negative feedback write 30% more frequently than before.
These effects are also statistically significant, and consistent
across all four communities.
The same general trend is true when considering the im-
pact of evaluations on user retention (Figure 6): punished
users (“Neg”) are more likely than rewarded users (“Pos”)
to stay in the community and contribute more posts (χ2 >
6.8, p < 0.01); also both types or users are less likely to
leave the community than the control group (“Avg”). Note,
however, that the nature of this experiment does not allow
one to control for the value of interest (retention rate) before
the evaluation.
The fact that both types of evaluations encourage users to
post more frequently suggests that providing negative feed-
back to “bad” users might not be a good strategy for com-
bating undesired behavior in a community. Given that users
who receive no feedback post less frequently, a potentially
effective strategy could be to ignore undesired behavior and
provide no feedback at all.
Voting Behavior
Our findings so far suggest that negative feedback worsens
the quality of future interactions in the community as pun-
ished users post more frequently. As we will discuss next,
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Figure 6: Rewarded users (“Pos”) are likely to leave the
community sooner than punished users (“Neg”). Average
users (“Avg”) are most likely to leave. For a given number
of subsequent posts x the retention rate is calculated as the
fraction of users that posted at least x more posts.
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Figure 7: Users seem to engage in “tit-for-tat” — the more
up-votes a user receives, the more likely she is to give up-
votes to content written by others.
these detrimental effects are exacerbated by the changes in
the voting behavior of evaluated users.
Tit-for-tat. As users receive feedback, both their posting
and voting behavior is affected. When comparing the frac-
tion of up-votes received by a user with the fraction of up-
votes given by a user, we find a strong linear correlation
(Figure 7). This suggests that user behavior is largely “tit-
for-tat”. If a user is negatively/positively evaluated, she in
turn will negatively/positively evaluate others. However, we
also note an interesting deviation from the general trend. In
particular, very negatively evaluated people actually respond
in a positive direction: the proportion of up-votes they give
is higher than the proportion of up-votes they receive. On
the other hand, users receiving many up-votes appear to be
more “critical”, as they evaluate others more negatively. For
example, people receiving a fraction of up-votes of 75% tend
to give up-votes only 67% of the time.
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Figure 8: If a user is evaluated negatively, then she also tends
to vote on others more negatively in the week following the
evaluation than in the week before the evaluation. However,
we observe no statistically significant effect on users who
receive a positive evaluation.
Figure 9: An example voting network G around a post a.
Users B to H up-vote (+) or down-vote (-) a, and may
also have voted on each other. The graph induced on the
four users who up-voted a (B,C,D,E) forms G+ (blue
nodes), and that induced on the three users who down-voted
a (F,G,H) forms G− (green nodes).
Nevertheless, this overall perspective does not directly
distinguish between the effects of positive and negative eval-
uations on voting behavior. To achieve that, Figure 8 com-
pares the change in voting behavior following a positive or
negative evaluation. We find that negatively-evaluated users
are more likely to down-vote others in the week following an
evaluation, than in the week before it (p < 10−13, r > 0.23).
In contrast, we observe no significant effect for the positively
evaluated users.
Overall, punished users not only change their posting be-
havior, but also their voting behavior by becoming more
likely to evaluate their fellow users negatively. Such behav-
ior can percolate the detrimental effects of negative feedback
through the community.
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(b) Edges across the camps
Figure 10: (a) The difference between the observed fraction
of balanced triangles and that obtained when edge signs are
shuffled at random. The peak at 50% suggests that when
votes are split evenly, these voters belong to different groups.
(b) The difference of the observed number of edges between
the up-voters and negative voters, versus those in the case
of random rewiring. The lowest point occurs when the votes
are split evenly.
Organization of Voting Networks
Having observed the effects community feedback has on
user behavior, we now turn our attention to structural signa-
tures of positive and negative feedback. In particular, we aim
at studying the structure of the social network around a post
and understanding (1) when do evaluations most polarize
this social network, and (2) whether positive/negative feed-
back comes from independent people or from tight groups.
Experimental setup. We define a social networks around
each post, a voting network, as illustrated in Figure 9. For a
given post a, we generate a graphG = (V,E), with V being
the set of users who voted on a. An edge (B,C) exists be-
tween votersB andC ifB voted onC in the 30 days prior to
when the post a was created. Edges are signed: positive for
up-votes, negative for down-votes. We examine voting net-
works for posts which obtained at least ten votes, and have
at least one up-vote and one down-vote.
When is the voting network most polarized? And, to
what degree do coalitions or factions form in a post’s voting
network? As our networks are signed, we apply structural
balance theory (Cartwright and Harary 1956), and examine
the fraction of balanced triads in our network. A triangle is
balanced if it contains three positive edges (a set of three
“friends”), or two negative edges and a positive edge (a pair
of “friends” with a common “enemy”). The more balanced
the network, the stronger the separation of the network into
coalitions — nodes inside the coalition up-vote each other,
and down-vote the rest of the network.
Figure 10a plots the fraction of balanced triangles in a
post’s voting network as a function of the proportion of up-
votes that post receives (normalized by randomly shuffling
the edge signs in the original voting network). When votes
on a post are split about evenly between up- and down-votes,
the network is most balanced. This means that when votes
are split evenly, the coalitions in the network are most pro-
nounced and thus the network most polarized. This observa-
tion holds in all four studied communities.
We also compare the number of edges between the up-
voters and down-voters (i.e., edges crossing between G+
and G−) to that of a randomly rewired network (a random
network with the same degree distribution as the original).
Figure 10b plots the normalized number edges between the
two camps as a function of the proportion of up-votes the
post received. We make two interesting observations. First,
the number of edges crossing the positive and negative camp
is lowest when votes are split about evenly. Thus, when votes
are split evenly not only is the network most balanced, but
also the number of edges crossing the camps is smallest.
Second, the number of edges is always below what occurs
in randomly rewired networks (i.e., the Z-scores are nega-
tive). This suggests that the camp of up-voters and the camp
of down-voters are generally not voting on each other. These
effects are qualitatively similar in all four communities.
Where does feedback come from? Having observed the
formation of coalitions, we are next interested in their rela-
tive size. Is feedback generally given by isolated individu-
als, or by tight groups of like-minded users? We find inter-
esting differences between communities. In general-interest
news sites like CNN, up-votes on positively-evaluated posts
are likely to come from multiple groups — the size of the
largest connected component decreases as the proportion of
up-votes increases. In other words, negative voters on a post
are likely to have voted on each other. However, on special-
interest web sites like Breitbart, IGN, and Allkpop, the size
of the largest connected component also peaks when votes
are almost all positive. Thus, up-voters in these communi-
ties are also likely to have voted on each other suggesting
that they come from tight groups.
Discussion
Rating, voting and other feedback mechanisms are heavily
used in today’s social media systems, allowing users to ex-
press opinions about the content they are consuming. In this
paper, we contribute to the understanding of how feedback
mechanisms are used in online systems, and how they affect
the underlying communities. We start from the observation
that when users evaluate content contributed by a fellow user
(e.g., by liking a post or voting on a comment) they also im-
plicitly evaluate the author of that content, and that this can
lead to complex social effects.
In contrast to previous work, we analyze effects of feed-
back at the user level, and validate our results on four large,
diverse comment-based news communities. We find that
negative feedback leads to significant changes in the author’s
behavior, which are much more salient than the effects of
positive feedback. These effects are detrimental to the com-
munity: authors of negatively evaluated content are encour-
aged to post more, and their future posts are also of lower
quality. Moreover, these punished authors are more likely to
later evaluate their fellow users negatively, percolating these
undesired effects through the community.
We relate our empirical findings to the operand condition-
ing theory from behavioral psychology, which explains the
underlying mechanisms behind reinforcement learning, and
find that the observed behaviors deviate significantly from
what the theory predicts. There are several potential factors
that could explain this deviation. Feedback in online settings
is potentially very different from that in controlled labora-
tory settings. For example, receiving down-votes is likely a
much less severe punishment than receiving electric shocks.
Also, feedback effects might be stronger if a user trusts the
authority providing feedback, e.g., site administrators down-
voting author’s posts could have a greater influence on the
author’s behavior than peer users doing the same.
Crucial to the arguments made in this paper is the abil-
ity of the machine learning regression model to estimate the
textual quality of a post. Estimating text quality is a very
hard machine learning problem, and although we validate
our model of text quality by comparing its output with hu-
man labels, the goodness of fit we obtain can be further im-
proved. Improving the model could allow for finer-grained
analysis and reveal even subtler relations between commu-
nity feedback and post quality.
Localized back-and-forth arguments between people (i.e.
flame wars) could also potentially affect our results. How-
ever, we discard these as being the sole explanation since
the observed behavioral changes carry on across different
threads, in contrast to flame wars which are usually con-
tained within threads. Moreover, we find that the set of
users providing feedback changes drastically across differ-
ent posts of the same user. This suggests that users do not
usually create “enemies” that continue to follow them across
threads and down-vote any posts they write. Future work is
needed to understand the scale and effects of such behavior.
There are many interesting directions for future research.
While we focused only on one type of feedback — votes
coming from peer users — there are several other types that
would be interesting to consider, such as feedback provided
through textual comments. Comparing voting communities
that support both up- and down-votes with those that only al-
low for up-votes (or likes) may also reveal subtle differences
in user behavior. Another open question is how the relative
authority of the feedback provider affects author’s response
and change in behavior. Further, building machine learning
models that could identify which types of users improve af-
ter receiving feedback and which types worsen could allow
for targeted intervention. Also, we have mostly ignored the
content of the discussion, as well as the context in which the
post appears. Performing deeper linguistic analysis, and un-
derstanding the role of the context may reveal more complex
interactions that occur in online communities.
More broadly, online feedback also relates to the key soci-
ological issues of norm enforcement and socialization (Par-
sons 1951; Cialdini and Trost 1998, inter alia), i.e. what role
does peer feedback play in directing users towards the be-
havior that the community expects, and how a user’s reac-
tion to feedback can be interpreted as her desire to con-
form to (or depart from) such community norms. For ex-
ample, our results suggest that negative feedback could be
a potential trigger of deviant behavior (i.e., behavior that
goes against established norms, such as trolling in online
communities). Here, surveys and controlled experiments can
complement our existing data-driven methodology and shed
light on these issues.
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